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The “Play-Out” Effect and Preference Reversals: 
Evidence for Noisy Maximization 
 
Abstract 
 
In this paper, we document a “play-out” effect in preference reversal experiments.  We compare 
data where preferences are elicited using (1) purely hypothetical gambles, (2) played-out, but 
unpaid gambles and (3) played-out gambles with truth-revealing monetary payments.  We ask 
whether a model of stable preferences with random errors (e.g., expected utility with errors) can 
explain the data.  The model is strongly rejected in data collected using purely hypothetical 
gambles.  However, simply playing-out the gambles, even in the absence of payments, shifts 
the data pattern so that noisy maximization is no longer rejected.  Inducing risk preferences 
using a lottery procedure, using monetary incentives or both shift the data pattern further so that 
noisy maximization achieves the best possible fit to the aggregate data.  No model could fit the 
data better.  We argue that play-out shifts the response pattern by inducing value because 
subjects can use outcomes to “keep score.” Induction or monetary payments create stronger 
induced values, shifting the pattern further.   
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The “Play-Out” Effect and Preference Reversals: 
Evidence for Noisy Maximization 
 
Money was never a big motivation for me, except as a way to keep score. The 
real excitement is playing the game.  
 
--Donald Trump, "Trump: Art of the Deal" 
 
I. Introduction 
Preference reversal data may call into question the economic assumption that subjects have 
a stable underlying preference function over gambles.  In a typical preference reversal 
experiment, subjects indicate their preference for gambles using two different methods:  (1) a 
direct “choice task” in which the subject indicates the preferred gamble from a pair of gambles 
directly indicating preference and (2) a “pricing task” in which the subject assigns values to the 
two gambles and the assigned values indicate preference.  A preference reversal occurs when 
the indicated preferences in the two tasks are inconsistent.  Reversal rates are high and appear 
to be impervious to incentives (Lichtenstein and Slovic (1971); Grether and Plott (1979)). 
The existence of any reversals indicates that subjects are not perfect expected utility (EUT) 
optimizers.  Strictly speaking, it would also violate non-expected utility (Non-EUT) preference 
functions that assume stable preferences across gambles (e.g., prospect theory).  If reversals 
are the result of systematic deviations from stable preferences, it calls expected utility and many 
non-expected utility theories into serious question.  However, reversals could also be the result 
of random (non-systematic) errors, especially if subjects do not have a strong preference across 
gambles.  This is not as damaging to theories of stable preference.  Modifying a stable 
preference function to incorporate random errors (something we term “noisy maximization” in 
Berg, Dickhaut and Rietz (2003)) would accommodate the data. In such a case, preferences do 
not actually reverse.  Instead, reported preferences may be inconsistent because subjects make 
random errors. 
Noisy maximization models are testable because they cannot explain all data patterns.  
When the difference in preferences indicated by the two tasks is large and there are systematic 
reversal patterns, the model fails.  Such is the case in Lichtenstein and Slovic (1971) and 
several replications where subjects declare preferences over hypothetical gambles.  In this 
paper, we show that hypothetical gamble data does not tell the entire story.  Using data 
gathered in Berg, Dickhaut and Rietz (2010) surveying near replications of Lichtenstein and 
Slovic, a detailed analysis of procedures and new experiments, we uncover a previously 
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undocumented effect in preference reversal data.  When the gambles are purely hypothetical 
(gambles are not played-out or paid-out), the data is inconsistent with noisy maximization – the 
differences in preferences declared in pricing and choice tasks simply cannot be accommodated 
by stable preferences and random errors.1  However, playing-out the gambles, even without 
paying subjects based on outcomes, shifts the pattern of responses.  Noisy maximization is no 
longer rejected.  We argue that this “play-out” effect arises because subjects can effectively 
“keep score” with the outcomes. This results in a weak form of induced value.2   
We also document a preference effect.  Playing-out the gambles followed by a played-out, 
but unpaid, risk preference induction lottery (a la Berg, Daley, Dickhaut and O’Brien (1986)) 
shifts the response pattern further:  Noisy maximization not only fits the data, but fits the data as 
well as any model possibly could in the sense that it maximizes the global likelihood function of 
the aggregate data.  Playing-out allows subjects to keep score and risk preference induction 
strengthens players’ preferences.  These two effects result in more systematically consistent 
revealed preferences across gambles.   
We also document an additional “payment” (incentives) effect.  Paying subjects based on 
outcomes (which requires play-out), also shifts the pattern.  Again, noisy maximization generally 
fits the data as well as any model could.  Finally, comparing data where we induce preferences 
under a play-out only design (with no monetary incentives tied to outcomes) and in a play-
out/payment design (with monetary incentives), we show an incentive effect.  Risk preferences 
estimated from prices move in the direction of induced risk preference in play-out only data, but 
are even closer with monetary incentives.   
The key to our results is considering the entire pattern of responses instead of focusing only 
on reversal rates.  In prior research (Berg, Dickhaut and Rietz (2010)), we summarize research 
replicating Lichtenstein and Slovic (1971).  Reversal rates range from 22% to 54%.  Reversal 
rates are somewhat lower when subjects reveal preference through played-out gambles with 
payments based on truth-revealing payment methods, but rates remain high and the effect of 
incentives is only marginally significant (p-value = 0.0893).  However, there is a significant 
change in the pattern of reversals.  Replications without outcome contingent payments largely 
accord with Lichtenstein and Slovic’s (1971) finding – a model of stable preferences expressed 
                                                                                                                                                          
1 We are not the first to point this out.  See, for example Lichtenstein and Slovic’s (1971) two-error-rate 
model analysis. 
2 The idea is similar to Hsee, Yu, Zhang and Zhang (2003), who argue that money, experimental currency 
units, points, or whatever the experimental medium of exchange is, becomes the objective of subjects.  
Subjects engage in “medium maximization” as a way of keeping score in the experiment even if the 
medium has no direct value.  Consistent with this, Camerer and Hogarth (1999) observe that, sometimes, 
subject behavior accords with economic theory even without monetary payments. 
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with random error cannot explain the declared preference data.  In contrast, truth revealing, 
monetary incentives typically result in patterns that are consistent with noisy maximization.  
Berg, Dickhaut and Rietz (2010) conclude that “incentives can generate more economically 
consistent behavior” presumably because the incentive structure creates a clearly defined 
objective function consistent with Smith’s (1976) idea of induced value.  
 In related research on the preference effect (Berg, Dickhaut and Rietz (2003)), we show 
that inducing risk preferences can have a strong impact on the pattern of preference reversals 
as well.  Commonly the gambles in preference reversal research have similar average payoffs 
but differ significantly in variance.  One gamble, the “p-bet,” has a high probably of a relatively 
low payoff and a low variance.  The other, the “$-bet,” has a low probability of a relatively high 
payoff and a high variance. Inducing risk aversion (risk seeking) creates a strong preferences 
for the p-bet ($-bet).  This reduces reversal rates overall and makes the pattern consistent with 
noisy maximization.  Berg, Dickhaut and Rietz (2003) argue that the risk preference induction 
mechanism creates stronger preferences across gambles than simple induced value. 
Here, we argue that a combination of three effects drives more coherent patterns in 
preference reversal data:   
1. A “payment” effect:  Subjects behave more coherently when being paid in a truth 
revealing manner based on outcomes.  This is Smith’s (1976) traditional, monetary 
induced value theory in context. 
2. A “preference” effect:  Subjects behave more coherently when a lottery mechanism is 
used to induce stronger preferences across gambles.  Berg, Dickhaut and Rietz (2003) 
document this in experiments where subjects are paid based on outcomes.  Here, we 
document the preference effect in sessions where outcomes are determined, but there 
are no subject payments tied to the outcomes. 
3. A previously undocumented “play-out” effect:  Subjects behave more coherently when 
gambles are played-out, even when subjects are not paid based on the outcomes.   
Of course, to pay subjects based on outcomes, at least one outcome must be determined by 
playing it out.  As a result, prior research confounds the play-out and payment effects.  Here, we 
disentangle them and find an independent play-out effect.  
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II. Preference Reversal  
A. Preference Reversal Tasks 
In typical preference reversal research,3 subjects evaluate pairs of gambles.  The two 
gambles in a pair have approximately the same expected value, but differ in variance.  One 
gamble, the “P-bet,” has a high probability of winning a low amount while the other, the “$-bet,” 
has a low probability of winning a large amount.  The timeline for the typical subject in a 
preference reversal experiment (for example, Lichtenstein and Slovic (1971)) given in Figure 1.  
First, three pairs are presented to the subject who must state which gamble in each pair is 
preferred.  Then, the subject values each individual gamble.  Finally, the last three pairs are 
presented to the subject.   
For each subject, the data on each gamble pair include the subject’s choice between the 
two gambles and the valuations (typically prices) of each gamble.  Each observation is either 
consistent (i.e., the gamble chosen in the choice task is the same as the gamble that is priced 
higher) or it represents a “reversal” because the chosen gamble and the highest price gamble 
are inconsistent.  Figure 2 shows a typical pattern of data from a preference reversal experiment 
(specifically Lichtenstein and Slovic’s (1971) Experiment 1).  In Cell a, the P-Bet is both chosen 
and priced higher and, in Cell d, the $-Bet is both chosen and priced higher.  These two cells 
represent consistent rankings.  Cells b and c represent reversals with the P-Bet chosen but the 
$-Bet priced higher (Cell b) or the $-Bet chosen with the P-Bet priced higher (Cell c).  The 
reversal rate is (b+c)/(a+b+c+d) = (441+32)/(88+441+32+477) = 0.456 = 45.6%.  Lichtenstein 
and Slovic (1971) show that their pattern of reversals is inconsistent with a model of stable 
underlying preference revealed with random error (i.e., “noisy maximization”).   
                                                                                                                                                          
3 Including the experiments run for this paper and in Berg, Dickhaut and Rietz (2003). 
Figure 1:  Timeline for a Perference Reversal Experiment 
The subject chooses 
 between gambles 
 in pairs 
(3 pairs) 

The subject states 
selling prices for  
each gamble 
(12 gambles) 

The subject chooses  
between gambles  
in pairs 
(3 pairs) 
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B. The Noisy Maximization (Two-Error-Rate) Model  
Lichtenstein and Slovic’s (1971) “two-error-rate” model assumes that (1) individual subjects 
have stable preferences across gambles but (2) preferences are revealed with random error 
where the error rates can differ across tasks.  Tasks do not affect preferences nor do 
preferences affect error rates.  This would be the case if subjects maximized expected utility or 
another stable preference function with errors.  Berg, Dickhaut and Rietz ((2003) and (2010)) 
examine whether this model of “noisy maximization” fits the data when truth-revealing incentives 
are used in preference reversal experiments.  In this paper, we ask whether playing-out the 
gambles alone has a similar effect.   
To parameterize the model, let “q” represent the percentage of subjects who prefer the 
P-bet, “r” represent the error rate in the choice task (rate at which the non-preferred gamble is 
chosen) and “s” represent the error rate in the pricing task (rate at which the non-preferred 
gamble is valued higher).  If we assume that errors in the choice task and the pricing task are 
random and independent (that is, making an error in the choice task does not affect the 
probability of making an error in the pricing task), then the pattern of observations generated in 
a preference reversal experiment should conform to Figure 3, where a, b, c and d represent the 
percentage of observations that fall into each cell. 
 
 
Figure 2:  Typical pattern of Preference Reversal Responses (from Lichtenstein and Slovic, 
1971, Experiment 1, 1038 observations) 
 
 P-bet priced 
higher 
$-bet priced 
higher 
P-bet chosen Cell a 
88
8.48%
Cell b 
441 
42.49% 
$-bet chosen Cell c 
32
3.08%
Cell d 
477 
45.95% 
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  If behavior is explained by the two-error rate model, then these proportions are also 
functions of q, r and s as defined in Figure 3.  When solutions exist for q, r and s that match the 
observed frequencies, these solutions are the maximum likelihood estimates of the parameters.4  
In fact, they would constitute a “best fit” model in the sense that these estimates maximize the 
global likelihood function of the aggregate data.  These estimates are: 5 
qො൫1-qො൯= ad-bcሺa+dሻ-(b+c), (1) 
 r̂= a+b-qො
1-2qො , and (2) 
 sො= a+c-qො
1-2qො . (3)  
 Notice that the two error rate model cannot always be parameterized to fit the data.  In 
particular, equation (1) may not have a real solution.  If ݍො = 0.5, there is no solution for ̂ݎ or ̂ݏ. 
Other estimates of ݍො, ̂ݎ or ̂ݏ may fall outside the valid 0 to 1 range.  Whether the two-error-rate 
model can be parameterized to fit the data and, if not, whether restrictions imposed by the two 
error rate model are significant is one factor we use to determine whether play-out and/or 
payment affect behavior in preference reversal experiments.  
                                                                                                                                                          
4 See Berg, Dickhaut and Rietz (2010) for details.  
5 Due to the quadratic form, there are two equivalent sets of parameters that satisfy these equations 
because q and 1-q are interchangeable.  The resulting estimates of r and s are each one minus the original 
estimate.  We do not take a stand on which set of estimates is “correct” because it is irrelevant to the 
likelihood function (both sets give the same likelihood) and, hence, to the likelihood ratio tests discussed 
below.  We let the data choose which set we display in the tables by minimizing the sum of the error rates r 
and s. 
Figure 3:  Two Error Rate Model 
 
 
 
P-bet Priced Higher $-bet Priced Higher 
 
P-bet Chosen 
 
(q)(1-r)(1-s) 
+ (1-q)(r)(s) 
 a 
(q)(1-r)(s) 
+ (1-q)(r)(1-s) 
b 
 
$-bet Chosen 
 
 c 
(q)(r)(1-s) 
+ (1-q)(1-r)(s) 
d 
(q)(r)(s) 
+(1-q)(1-r)(1-s) 
 
where: 
q = percentage of subjects whose underlying preference 
ordering ranks the P-bet higher 
r = error rate in the paired-choice task 
s = error rate in the pricing task 
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III. Play-out, Payment and Preference Induction in Preference Reversal Experiments 
Lichtenstein and Slovic (1971) and Berg, Dickhaut and Rietz (2010) show that the data from 
the Lichtenstein and Slovic (1971) experiment differs significantly from a data pattern that could 
be explained by noisy maximization.  This result is due to the overall pattern of choices as 
measured by conditional reversal rates (the reversal rate in one task conditional on the 
choice(s) in the other task), not simply the overall reversal rate.  Results that are inconsistent 
with noisy maximization are generally the case in other preference reversal experiments when 
subjects are not paid based on the outcomes of their decisions.  Here, we replicate this result in 
a new experiment.  We also show that, in data from experiments where subjects are paid in a 
truth-revealing manner, reversals remain.  However, the data accords with noisy maximization.  
This holds for Grether and Plott (1979) experiment 1b, most of the experiments in the literature 
and on data aggregated across experiments. 
In Berg, Dickhaut and Rietz (2003), we study how inducing risk preferences (using the Berg, 
Daley, Dickhaut and O’Brien (1986) lottery procedure) affects behavior.  Again, the pattern 
accords with noisy maximization.  In addition, creating a strong preference across gambles 
using risk preference induction can decrease the overall reversal rate.   
All experiments in the literature to date use one of two incentive schemes: (1) the gambles 
are played-out and subjects receive outcome contingent payments or (2) the gambles are not 
played-out and subjects do not receive outcome contingent payments. Note that providing 
outcomes-based payments and playing-out gambles are completely confounded.  In the 
experiments with payments, the outcomes can be used to “keep score.” In the experiment 
without incentives, there is no way to keep score.  Could it be that the change in behavior is not 
driven by payments per se, but rather by playing-out the gambles and allowing subjects to keep 
score through observing the outcomes?  We present results showing that play-out does affect 
behavior, even when there are no truth-revealing incentive payments.  However, payments also 
have an effect, creating an even more coherent response pattern.  Both matter. 
IV. Experimental Procedures and Data 
We compare three sources of data: 
(1) aggregated outcomes from the prior research that replicated Lichtenstein and Slovic (1971) 
with and without incentive payments as reported in Berg, Dickhaut and Rietz (2010), 
(2) individual experiments reported in Lichtenstein and Slovic (1971), Grether and Plott  (1979) 
and Berg, Dickhaut and Rietz (2003), and 
(3) new experiments.  
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The prior research allows us to benchmark our results and place them in context.  Our new 
experiments use essentially the same design and instructions as used in Berg, Dickhaut and 
Rietz (2003). Modifications to the instructions depend on the treatment as discussed below.  
Treatment variables across experiments include: 
(1) whether subjects are paid based on experimental outcomes (which requires that gambles be 
played-out); 
(2) whether subjects have risk preferences induced using the binary lottery procedure (which 
requires that gambles and lotteries be played-out); 
(3) whether the gambles are actually played-out (this necessarily occurs when there are 
outcome-contingent incentive payments, but can be present or not when there are no 
outcome-based payments). 
This leads to the design shown in Table 1.  Cells in Table 1 are labelled NP or P to indicate 
whether gambles are Not Played-out or Played-out; N, RA, RN or RS to indicate Native 
preferences, induced Risk Averse, induced Risk Neutral or induced Risk Seeking preferences; 
and NI or I to indicate No (monetary) Incentives tied to gamble outcomes or (monetary) 
Incentives tied to gamble outcomes. 
For data in cell P-N-I (gambles played-out, native preferences, and monetary incentives tied 
to gamble outcomes), we use aggregate data from the literature as reported in Berg, Dickhaut 
and Rietz (2010) (labelled “Lit. Agg.”) and Grether and Plott’s (1979) Experiment 1b (labelled 
G&P1b) as a benchmark data set.  For data in cell NP-N-NI  (gambles not played-out, native 
preferences, no monetary incentives tied to gamble outcomes), we use aggregate data from the 
literature as reported in Berg, Dickhaut and Rietz (2010) (labelled “Lit. Agg.”) and Lichtenstein 
and Slovic’s (1971) Experiment 1 (labelled L&S1) as a benchmark data set.  For data in the 
other cells with monetary incentives tied to gamble outcomes, we use the experiments from 
Berg, Dickhaut and Rietz (2003) (labelled BDR-RA, BDR-RN and BDR-RS).  Finally, for data in 
all of the cells with no incentives tied to gamble outcomes, we run new experiments for this 
 
Table 1: Design 
  Incentives Treatment 
Play Treatment Induction Treatment 
No Incentives Tied 
to Gamble Outcomes
Incentives Tied to 
Gamble Outcomes
Gambles Not Played Native Preferences NP-N-NI   
Gambles Played and  
Outcomes Revealed 
Native Preferences P-N-NI P-N-I 
Induced Risk Averse P-RA-NI P-RA-I 
Induced Risk Neutral P-RN-NI P-RN-I 
Induced Risk Seeking P-RS-NI P-RS-I 
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paper (this creates a new replication in cell NP-N-NI). Instructions for the existing experiments 
can be found in the original papers.  The appendix contains instructions for the new 
experiments. 
V. Results 
C. Aggregate Results 
Table 2 presents summary data across treatments.  The first three rows (labeled NP) are all 
treatments in which gambles were not played-out.  The other rows (rows 4-12) are all 
treatments in which gambles were played-out.  As discussed in the prior research (ranging from 
Grether and Plott (1979) to Berg, Dickhaut and Rietz (2010)), reversal rates themselves are 
largely unaffected by the payment treatment.  The lone significant exception is a drop in the 
reversal rate in treatment P-RA-I, where the gambles are played-out, and subjects are paid 
based on outcomes under induced risk aversion. 
While there is no obvious effect on the level of reversals, Table 2 reveals that there is an effect 
on the percentage of times the P-bet is preferred in the choice and pricing tasks.  Large 
differences in preferences between the two tasks occur when there are no outcome-based 
incentives and the gambles are not played-out.  In Lichtenstein and Slovic (1971), subjects are 
much more likely to prefer the P-bet in the choice tasks than in the pricing task (the differenct 
between the tasks is 0.394).  Our replication shows the same result (the difference is 0.276). 
In contrast, revealed preference for the P-bet is more similar across tasks when the gambles 
are played-out, whether or not there are outcome-based incentives.  Berg, Dickhaut and Rietz 
(2010), document this effect when subjects are paid (and by construction, gambles are played-
Table 2:  P-bet Preferences and Reversal Rates across Treatments 
Incentives  
Category 
Data 
Set Obs. 
Avg. Pref. For 
the P-bet 
According to 
Choices 
(a+b)/(a+b+c+d)
Avg. Pref. For 
the P-bet 
According to 
Prices 
(a+c)/(a+b+c+d)
Difference 
Between 
P-bet 
Preference 
Measures 
Reversal Rate 
(b+c)/(a+b+c+d)
NP-N-NI Lit. Agg. 4644 0.524 0.318 0.206 0.409
NP-N-NI L&S1 1038 0.510 0.116 0.394 0.456
NP-N-NI New 134 0.672 0.396 0.276 0.410
P-N-NI New 141 0.603 0.496 0.106 0.390
P-RA-NI New 158 0.703 0.570 0.133 0.399
P-RN-NI New 156 0.564 0.513 0.051 0.462
P-RS-NI New 157 0.299 0.433 0.134 0.401
P-N-I Lit. Agg. 3185 0.411 0.284 0.127 0.362
P-N-I G&P1b 262 0.363 0.183 0.179 0.347
P-RA-I BDR-RA 275 0.927 0.880 0.047 0.164
P-RN-I BDR-RN 244 0.553 0.590 0.037 0.365
P-RS-I BDR-RS 247 0.146 0.324 0.178 0.372
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out).  However, our new experiments reveal that just playing-out the bets reduces the difference 
between tasks.  The difference in P-bet preference across tasks is smaller when the gambles 
are played-out (P-N-NI) than when they are not played-out (NP-N-NI), even though subjects do 
not receive truth-revealing monetary incentives. 
Table 3 shows the conditional reversal rates.  In Berg, Dickhaut and Rietz (2003) and 
(2010), we argue that the pattern of conditional reversal rates under induced risk preferences is 
consistent with noisy maximization models with error correction.   
Consider the data under risk averse preferences (Incentives Category P-RA-I).  Subjects 
should be risk averse.  If they “err” in the choice task, by choosing the $-bet (inconsistent with 
risk aversion), the reversal rate should be high if they correct the “error” in the pricing task.  On 
the other hand, the reversal rate should be low if they choose the P-bet.  Similarly, if they err in 
the pricing task, by pricing the $-bet higher, the reversal rate should be high if they correct the 
error in the choice task.  The rate should be low if they price the P-bet higher.  This is exactly 
the data pattern we observe.  Subjects who choose the P-bet reverse 11.4% of the time in the 
pricing task.  Subjects who price the P-bet higher reverse 6.6% of the time in the choice task.  In 
contrast, consistent with error correction, the reversal rates skyrocket if the subjects choose the 
$-Bet (80.0% of the time) or price the $-Bet higher (87.9% of the time).   
Though somewhat weaker, the opposite pattern holds for risk seeking preferences 
(Incentives Category P-RS-I).  Under risk neutral preferences and native preferences, there is 
no strong pattern in the conditional reversal rate.  This is consistent with relatively risk neutral 
subjects and random errors.  
Table 3: Conditional Reversal Rates Across Treatments 
Incentives  
Category Data Set Obs. 
Conditional (on Choice) 
Reversal Rates 
Conditional (on Pricing)  
Reversal Rates 
P-bet $-bet 
Difference
P-bet $-bet 
Difference(b/(a+b)) (c/(c+d)) (c/(a+c)) (b/(b+d)) 
NP-N-NI Lit. Agg. 4644 0.586 0.213 0.374 0.318 0.451 -0.133
NP-N-NI L&S1 1038 0.834 0.063 0.771 0.267 0.480 -0.214
NP-N-NI New 134 0.511 0.205 0.307 0.170 0.568 -0.398
P-N-NI New 141 0.412 0.357 0.055 0.286 0.493 -0.207
P-RA-NI New 158 0.378 0.447 -0.068 0.233 0.618 -0.384
P-RN-NI New 156 0.455 0.471 -0.016 0.400 0.526 -0.126
P-RS-NI New 157 0.447 0.382 0.065 0.618 0.236 0.382
P-N-I Lit. Agg. 3185 0.595 0.199 0.396 0.414 0.342 0.072
P-N-I G&P1b 262 0.726 0.132 0.595 0.322 0.458 -0.136
P-RA-I BDR-RA 275 0.114 0.800 -0.686 0.066 0.879 -0.813
P-RN-I BDR-RN 244 0.296 0.450 -0.153 0.340 0.400 -0.060
P-RS-I BDR-RS 247 0.667 0.322 0.344 0.850 0.144 0.706
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While the differences are considerably smaller, they remain under induced preferences even 
when the subjects are not paid.  Under induced risk aversion without outcome-based incentives 
(Incentives Category P-RA-NI), the $-bet conditional reversal rates exceed the P-bet conditional 
reversal rates.  Under induced risk seeking without outcome-based incentives (Incentives 
Category P-RS-NI), the P-bet conditional reversal rates exceed the $-bet conditional reversal 
rates.   
The two-error-rate model allows us to ask precisely whether behavior is consistent with 
noisy maximization.  Table 4 shows these estimates from the aggregate data in each incentives 
category.  Just playing-out the gambles clearly has an effect. When gambles are not played-out, 
(Incentives Category NP-N-NI), the two error rate model cannot accommodate the data.  This 
occurs across individual experiments in the existing literature, on average in the existing 
literature, and in our new experiment. 
When gambles are played-out, the two-error-rate model fits the data exactly in all but one 
case, and in that case, the difference is insignificant.  Estimates of the preferences for the P-bet 
(q) are highest under induced risk aversion (Incentives Categories P-RA-NI and P-RA-I) and 
nearly 1 when subjects are paid based on outcomes (Incentives Category P-RA-I).  Estimates of 
the preferences for the P-bet (q) are lowest under induced risk seeking (Incentives Categories 
P-RS-NI and P-RS-I) and nearly 0 when subjects are paid based on outcomes (Incentives 
Category P-RS-I).   
In summary, our aggregate results show that: 
1. Playing-out the gambles (that is, allowing subjects to keep score) generates more 
economically consistent behavior.   
Table 4: Estimates of the Two-Error-Rate Model Across Treatments 
Incentives  
Category Data Set Obs. 
Two–Error-Rate Model 
Estimates 
LR Test Stat q r s 
NP-N-NI Lit. Agg. 4644 0.318 0.409 0.000 74.65* 
NP-N-NI L&S1 1038 0.116 0.456 0.000 20.42* 
NP-N-NI New 134 0.396 0.410 0.000 22.36* 
P-N-NI New 141 0.603 0.000 0.390 0.425 
P-RA-NI New 158 0.764 0.116 0.368 Equal 
P-RN-NI New 156 0.603 0.190 0.438 Equal 
P-RS-NI New 157 0.239 0.115 0.372 Equal 
P-N-I Lit. Agg. 3185 0.236 0.331 0.091 Equal 
P-N-I G&P1b 262 0.122 0.318 0.080 Equal 
P-RA-I BDR-RA 275 0.991 0.065 0.113 Equal 
P-RN-I BDR-RN 244 0.633 0.300 0.162 Equal 
P-RS-I BDR-RS 247 0.005 0.142 0.322 Equal 
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2. Risk preference induction generates more economically consistent behavior while 
generating behavior consistent with the induced preferences.   
3. The choice patterns are most consistent when subjects are paid based on outcomes.   
D. Analysis of Individual Prices 
We also ask whether the play-out effect appears in individual pricing decisions.  Here, we 
study the data from the six treatments in Berg, Dickhaut and Rietz (2003) and the three new 
data sets that use identical gambles, instructions and risk preference induction procedures.  The 
only difference in procedures is that, in the sessions run for this paper, subjects are paid a flat 
participation fee rather than receiving outcome-contingent payments.  In all cases, risk 
preferences are induced using Berg, Daley, Dickhaut and O’Brien’s (1986) lottery procedure 
with an induced utility function of U(w) = eγw, where w is the payoff from a task and γ=-0.11 for 
risk averse, γ=0 for risk neutral and γ=0.11 for risk seeking preferences.6   
                                                                                                                                                          
6 See Berg, Dickhaut and Rietz (2003) for details.  
Figure 4:  Average Prices of Bets by Treatment 
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Under risk averse, risk neutral and risk seeking induced preferences, prices for individual 
gambles should be successively higher in theory.  Figure 4 shows average prices for each 
gamble under each treatment.  The $-bet (riskier bet) in each pair is graphed in red while the P-
bet (less risky bet) in each pair is graphed in green.  The upper left graph shows prices when 
preferences are not induced.  Regardless of whether the gambles are played-out or not, the 
prices of gambles within a pair align closely.  This is consistent with subjects’ native risk 
preference being approximately risk neutral.  
The upper right graph shows some divergence under induced risk neutral preferences, 
possibly because of noise introduced by the risk preference induction procedure.  But, again 
subjects are approximately risk neutral.   
The bottom two graphs show increasing divergence under induced risk seeking (left) and 
risk averse (right) preferences.  As expected, under induced risk seeking preferences, 
valuations generally exceed expected values and $-bet (riskier) prices exceed p-bet (less risky) 
prices.  Also as expected, under induced risk averse preferences, valuations are generally lower 
than expected values and p-bet (less risky) prices exceed $-bet (riskier) prices. Recall that the 
gambles are played-out in all but the upper left graph in Figure 4.  As seen by comparing the 
incentives and no incentives treatments, simply playing the gamble makes subject behavior 
conform to the noisy maximization model.  However, effects appear stronger for incentives 
treatments than no-incentives treatments.  
Under induction, we can compute the theoretical certainty equivalent for each gamble as: 
Table 5: Gambles and Certainty Equivalents 
Pair Type 
Probability 
of Winning 
Points 
if Win 
Points 
If Lose 
Expected 
Points (Risk 
Neutral 
Certainty 
Equivalent) 
Risk Averse 
Certainty 
Equivalent 
Risk Loving 
Certainty 
Equivalent 
1 P $ 
35/36 
11/36 
9 
27 
2 
1 
8.81 
8.94 
8.71 
4.09 
8.86 
17.33 
2 P $ 
33/36 
9/36 
14 
40 
2 
4 
13.00 
13.00 
12.13 
6.56 
13.43 
27.90 
3 P $ 
32/36 
12/36 
15 
36 
14 
4 
14.89 
14.67 
14.88 
7.55 
14.89 
26.54 
4 P $ 
30/36 
18/36 
23 
40 
5 
0 
20.00 
20.00 
16.52 
6.19 
21.59 
33.81 
5 P $ 
27/36 
18/36 
26 
39 
22 
11 
25.00 
25.00 
24.82 
16.89 
25.15 
33.11 
6 P $ 
29/36 
7/36 
13 
37 
3 
5 
11.06 
11.22 
10.01 
6.90 
11.74 
23.16 
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 CE= ln൫phe
γh+(1-ph)eγl൯
γ , (4) 
where CE is the certainty equivalent, h is the high payoff, l is the low payoff and ph is the 
probability of the high payoff. This provides a benchmark value for each gamble under each risk 
preference.  Table 5 (reproduced from Berg, Dickhaut and Rietz (2003)) presents the gambles 
and certainty equivalents for these data sets.  The certainty equivalents tell us what prices 
should be if subjects maximize expected utility under the risk preference induction technique. 
We can compare this to actual prices.  Alternatively, we can estimate the risk aversion 
parameter displayed in a particular subject’s prices using non-linear regression by setting 
gamma to minimize the squared deviation between (4) and the actual prices submitted by that 
subject across the twelve gambles.   
Table 6 shows the deviations of prices from certainty equivalents for each treatment. On 
average, induced risk averse subjects over price gambles.  There is a significant incentive 
effect.  The overpricing is most severe with no outcomes based incentives and least severe 
under high incentives levels.  Induced risk neutral subjects also tend to over price gambles.  
Again, there is a significant incentive effect with the most severe (and most significant) over 
pricing under no incentives and the least severe (and least significant) over pricing under high 
incentives.  Without incentives, induced risk seeking subjects under price gambles.  Again, there 
Table 6: Deviations from Induced Certainty Equivalents by Risk Preference Induction 
Treatment and Incentives Levels 
Risk Preference 
Induction Treatment  Item  
Incentives Treatment  Kruskal-Wallis Tests of 
Incentives Effects  High Low None 
Averse 
Observations 288 276 360
χ2 Statistic 
d.o.f. 
p-value 
  
18.005*** 
2 
0.0001 
 
Mean 2.0656 3.5078 4.0927
Std. Dev. 6.0237 6.4361 7.8432
Robust T-Stat.# 3.56*** 5.21*** 4.89***
p-value 0.002 0.000 0.000
Neutral 
Observations 312 288 360
χ2 Statistic 
d.o.f. 
p-value 
  
6.202** 
2.0000 
0.0450 
 
Mean 1.3905 1.4896 2.0236
Std. Dev. 7.4993 5.9743 6.6652
Robust T-Stat. # 1.88* 2.21** 4.32***
p-value 0.0720 0.0380 0.0000
Seeking 
Observations 264 288 348
χ2 Statistic 
d.o.f. 
p-value 
  
6.976** 
2 
0.0306 
 
Mean -1.967 -2.033 -3.983
Std. Dev. 9.611 9.569 8.674
Robust T-Stat. # -1.70 -2.44** -6.32***
p-value 0.104 0.0230 0.0000
#Clustered by subject. 
*Significant at the 90% level of confidence. 
*Significant at the 95% level of confidence. 
*Significant at the 99% level of confidence. 
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is a significant incentive effect.  The magnitude of the under pricing falls with incentives and the 
significance of the under pricing disappears under high incentives.  However, notice that often 
the standard deviation of prices relative to certainty equivalent goes up with incentives.  Overall, 
prices move closer to theoretical predictions as incentives increase even though incentives may 
not necessarily eliminate noise.  This is why reversal rates may not fall with incentives even 
though prices are more coherent on average.   
Table 7 shows, for each treatment, median estimates of the risk aversion parameter 
estimated using non-linear regression.  For all subjects, the non-linear regressions converged.  
For most subjects, it converged to reasonable estimates.  However, a few produce estimates 
that are clearly outliers (e.g., if a subject prices several gambles above (below) the maximum 
(minimum) possible payoff, the estimate may show extreme risk seeking (aversion)).  Because 
of these outliers, we use medians as our measure of central tendency and non-parametric sign-
rank and Kruskal-Wallis tests for deviations from predictions and incentives effects.  
Median estimates of the risk aversion parameter are all negative for risk aversion (as 
predicted), but fall short of the predicted level of -0.11.  There is a significant incentive effect, 
with high incentives created more risk averse estimates which are closer to the predicted level. 
Table 7: Individual Risk Aversion Parameter Estimates by Risk Preference Induction 
Treatment and Incentives Levels 
Risk 
Preference 
Induction 
Treatment Item 
Incentives Treatment 
Kruskal-Wallis Tests of 
Incentives Effects High Low None 
Averse 
Observations 24 23 20
χ2 Statistic 
d.o.f. 
p-value 
  
16.033*** 
2 
0.0003 
 
Median -0.0743 -0.0463 -0.0134
Inter-quartile Range 0.0619 0.0454 0.0686
Sign Rank Test Statistic# 2.029** 3.315*** 3.527***
p-value 0.0425 0.0009 0.004
Neutral 
Observations 26 24 30
χ2 Statistic 
d.o.f. 
p-value 
  
1.825 
2.0000 
0.4015 
 
Median -0.0020 0.0062 0.0118
Inter-quartile Range 0.0645 0.0497 0.0198
Sign Rank Test Statistic# 0.317 0.914 2.808***
p-value 0.7509 0.3606 0.0050
Seeking 
Observations 22 24 29
χ2 Statistic 
d.o.f. 
p-value 
  
2.883 
2 
0.2366 
 
Median 0.0479 0.0577 0.0311
Inter-quartile Range 0.0832 0.0753 0.0976
Sign Rank Test Statistic# -2.808*** -4.000*** -3.925***
p-value 0.0050 0.0001 0.0001
#Sign rank test statistics measure whether the median estimated risk aversion parameter differs from 
the predictions of -0.11, 0 and 0.11 for risk averse, neutral and seeking induced preferences, 
respectively. 
*Significant at the 90% level of confidence. 
*Significant at the 95% level of confidence. 
*Significant at the 99% level of confidence. 
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The median induced risk neutral subject without incentives displays a positive (risk seeking) 
preference parameter.  However, when subjects are paid, the medians do not differ significantly 
from zero.  Median induced risk seeking subjects all have positive estimated risk preference 
parameters (as predicted) but they fall short of the predicted value of 0.11.  With increasing 
incentives, the inter-quartile range does not necessarily fall.  As a result, risk preference 
induction moves subjects in the right direction but not as far as predicted by theory.  When there 
is an incentives effect, higher incentives push behavior closer to predictions. But again, in this 
context, incentives do not necessarily reduce noise.  
Figure 5 shows the median estimated risk aversion parameter and inter-quartile ranges 
under each treatment.  While risk averse parameters are always lower and risk seeking 
parameters are always higher than risk neutral (as predicted), the differences are small and the 
inter-quartile ranges overlap without incentives (labeled “none”).  As incentives increase, the 
median estimated values remain close to zero (as predicted) for induced risk neutral 
preferences.  They fall dramatically for risk averse induced preferences (as predicted).  They 
rise and level off for risk seeking induced preferences. These effects are significant as shown by 
the following median regression: 
Figure 5: Medians and Inter-Quartile Ranges of Estimated Risk Aversion Parameters by 
Treatment 
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where the incentives category is a category defined as 0 for no incentives, 1 for low incentives 
and 2 for high incentives; risk seeking and risk averse dummies are 1 under the appropriate risk 
preference induction treatments; numbers in parentheses are z-statistics; “***” denotes 
significance at the 99.9% level of confidence, “**” denotes significance at the 99% level of 
confidence and “*” denotes significance at the 90% level of confidence. 
Without incentives, but playing-out the gambles, subjects appear slightly risk seeking under 
induced risk neutrality (intercept>0).  Inducing risk aversion or risk seeking affects the estimated 
risk preference parameter significantly in the predicted direction even without incentives 
(significance on both dummy variables alone with the appropriate signs).  Increasing incentives 
has little effect under induced risk neutrality.  Increasing incentives moves estimated risk 
aversion parameters closer to their predicted values (significance on the interaction terms with 
the appropriate signs).   
VI. Discussion 
If subjects reverse preferences systematically depending on how preferences are elicited 
(e.g., through choice or pricing tasks), it presents serious challenges for economic theory.  On 
the other hand, if subjects have stable preferences, but reveal them with random errors, 
economic theory simply needs to be extended to allow for errors in revelation.  That is, we may 
need to think of economic agents as “noisy maximizers” instead of strict expected utility 
maximizers.  If this is the case, preference reversal is actually a misnomer.  Errors only cause 
the appearance of reversal. 
Previous evidence documenting systematic preference reversals is based on stated 
preferences over purely hypothetical gambles.  Monetary incentives can shift the pattern of the 
data, making it consistent with noisy maximization.  However, previous preference reversal 
studies documenting incentive effects all confound incentive payments and playing-out 
gambles.  In this paper, we introduce new experimental treatments that allow us to tease apart 
the effect of truth-revealing incentives from the effect of providing a “score keeping” mechanism 
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through playing-out gambles.  This allows us to identify three separate effects that drive data to 
be more consistent with the stable preference with errors (noisy maximization) model: 
1. A monetary incentive “payout effect” that we first documented in Berg, Dickhaut and 
Rietz (2010). When subjects are paid based on the outcomes of the gambles in a truth 
revealing manner, noisy maximization fits the aggregate data as well as any model 
could.  Apparent reversal rates may still be high because, as the data suggests, subjects 
do not have strong preferences across the gambles. 
2. A “preference effect” that we first documented in Berg, Dickhaut and Rietz (2003).  
When subject risk preferences are induced using a lottery procedure, noisy maximization 
again fits the data as well as any model could.  Revealed preferences consistently shift 
in the direction predicted by the induced utility function and reversal rates fall.  Here, we 
document the effect even when subjects are not paid based on the outcomes. 
3. A new “play-out effect.”  When gambles are played-out, even when subjects are not paid 
based on outcomes, revealed preferences do not differ significantly from noisy 
maximization.  Again, risk preference induction (with play-out, but no payments) leads to 
data where noisy maximization fits as well as any model could.    
Our play-out effect is related to the differences between declared versus revealed 
preferences (see, for example, Ben-Akiva, et al. (1994)) where survey responses differ from 
actual behavior.  Hypothetical gambles effectively elicit stated preferences, which reverse in a 
systematic manner.  Played-out gambles with outcome contingent payments reveal preferences 
that appear stable, but are revealed with error.  Data under played-out, but unpaid, gambles 
appears similar to the revealed preference data.  This shows the importance of the play-out 
effect in generating more economically consistent data.  It also suggests that the common 
practice of running a multi-stage experiment and randomly selecting a single stage for play-out 
and payoffs ex post may weaken incentives.7 
Our results are also related to the literature on incentives effects.  While play-out alone has 
a significant effect, incentives and higher incentives under induced incentives drive behavior 
closer to that predicted by the induced incentives.  While the play-out effect is new, the payment 
effect is consistent with Jamal and Sunder’s (1991) observation that payments are not 
necessary for convergence in double oral auction markets, but do make the results more 
reliable.  It is also consistent with Camerer and Hogarth’s (1999) survey observation that 
incentives often reduce noise.  
                                                                                                                                                          
7 We note that, in our data, we play-out every choice, gamble and induction lottery after each choice.  
Even though Grether and Plott (1979) follow pay based on one randomly selected outcome ex post in 
their experiment 1b, their data is nevertheless consistent with the noisy maximization. 
19 
 
Finally, our results are consistent with Donald Trump’s observation about money being a 
score keeping mechanism to determine the winner.  It is consistent with subjects having a utility 
of winning (see, for example, Rietz (1993) or Sheremeta (2010)) and needing to play-out the 
gambles to determine whether they “won.”  It explains why simple mechanisms, such as 
publishing “employee of the month” could have an effect on behavior even when there is no 
noticeable incentive tied to the designation.  It also helps explain how competitions among 
groups can have incentives when there are no explicit prizes except “bragging rights.” 
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Appendix:  Instructions 
 
VIII. A. Instructions for NP-N-NI (Not-Played-Out, Native Preferences, No Incentives) 
 
Instructions 
This is an experiment in individual decision making.  At the end of the experiment, you 
will receive your $5 show up fee and a flat fee of an additional $15 for participation in the 
experiment.  These are the only payments you will receive for participating.    
As a participant in this experiment, you will make decisions. There are 18 decision items 
in this experiment.   
Each decision you make will involve one or more bets. These bets will be indicated by 
pie charts as shown below.  The point areas in each bet correspond to a hypothetical draw from 
a bingo cage that contains 36 red balls numbered 1, 2, …, 36. The ball drawn would determine 
the point outcome of the bet.  For example, suppose you were playing the bet below.  If the red 
ball drawn was less than or equal to 10, you would receive 30 points.  If the red ball drawn was 
greater than 10, you would receive 5 points. 
  
30 
points
5 
points
9
18
10
27
36
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Part 1: 
In this part you will be asked to consider several pairs of bets.  For each pair you should 
indicate which bet you would prefer to play or indicate that you are indifferent between them.   
Part 2: 
In this part you are given several opportunities make decisions.  For each bet you must 
indicate the smallest number of points for which you would give up the opportunity to play the 
bet.   
Practice Item 1:  Suppose you have the opportunity to play the bet shown below.  What is the 
smallest number of points for which you would give up this opportunity?   
 
 
Decision             . 
Stop here and wait for the experimenter to tell you to go on to the next practice item.
30 
points
5 
points
9
18
10
27
36
  
Practice Item 2:  Suppose you have the opportunity to play the bet shown below.  What is the 
smallest number of points for which you would give up this opportunity?  
Decision         . 
 
Practice Item 3:  Suppose you have the opportunity to play the bet shown below.  What is the 
smallest number of points for which you would give up this opportunity?     
 Decision         . 
 
38 
points
0 
points 9
18
27
36
39 
points
9 
points
9
18
14
27
36
  
Part 3: 
This part is exactly like Part 1.  You will be asked to consider several pairs of bets, and 
for each pair you should indicate which bet you would prefer to play or indicate that you are 
indifferent between them.   
 
Instructions for P-N-NI (Play, Native Preferences, No Incentives) 
 
Instructions 
This is an experiment in individual decision making.  At the end of the experiment, you 
will receive your $5 show up fee and a flat fee of an additional $15 for participation in the 
experiment.  These are the only payments you will receive for participating.    
As a participant in this experiment, you will receive points for making decisions. There 
are 18 decision items in this experiment.   
Each decision you make will involve one or more bets. These bets will be indicated by 
pie charts as shown below.  When a bet is played, one ball will be drawn from a bingo cage that 
contains 36 red balls numbered 1, 2, …, 36. The ball drawn determines the point outcome of the 
bet.  For example, suppose you are playing the bet below.  If the red ball drawn was less than or 
equal to 10, you would receive 30 points.  If the red ball drawn was greater than 10, you would 
receive 5 points. 
Now let's use the bet shown below as a practice item. 
  
The number that the experimenter drew from the cage of red balls is _____.   
This means that I would receive ____ points as a result of this bet.   
Part 1: 
In this part you will be asked to consider several pairs of bets.  For each pair you should 
indicate which bet you prefer to play or indicate that you are indifferent between them.  After 
each decision, you will have an opportunity to using the following procedure: 
1. The bet you indicate as preferred will be played and you will receive the points 
indicated by its outcome.  If you check "Indifferent" the bet you play will be 
determined by a coin toss. 
Part 2: 
In this part you are given several opportunities to play bets to obtain points.  For each 
bet you must indicate the smallest number of points for which you would give up the opportunity 
to play the bet.   
After each decision, you will have an opportunity to receive points using the following 
procedure: 
30 
points
5 
points
9
18
10
27
36
  
1. A ball will be drawn from a bingo cage containing 41 green balls numbered 
0,1,2,…,40.  If the number on this green ball is less than or equal to the 
number you have specified, you will keep the bet and play it.  You will receive 
the points indicated by the outcome of the bet.  If the number on the green ball 
is greater than the number you have specified, you will give up the bet and in 
exchange receive the points equal to the number on the ball.   
It is in your best interest to be accurate; that is, the best thing you can do is be honest.  If 
the number of points you state is too high or too low, then you are passing up opportunities that 
you prefer.  For example, suppose you would be willing to give up the bet for 20 points but 
instead you say that the lowest amount for which you would give it up is 30 points.  If the green 
ball drawn at random is between the two (for example 25) you would be forced to play the bet 
even though you would rather have given it up for 25 points.   
On the other hand, suppose that you would give it up for 20 points but not for less, but 
instead you state your amount as 10 points.  If the green ball drawn at random is between the 
two (for example 15) you would be forced to give up the bet for 15 points even though at that 
amount you would prefer to play it. 
 
Practice Item 1:  Suppose you have the opportunity to play the bet shown below.  What is the 
smallest number of points for which you would give up this opportunity?   
  
 
 
Decision             . 
 In order which results from this decision, you need to know two things: 
(1) The ball drawn from the cage of green balls. 
(2) The ball drawn from the cage of red balls. 
The two examples in this practice item fix these draws so that you can concentrate on how your 
decision and the results of the draws will determine your points. 
Example 1:  Use your decision in the Practice Item 1 and suppose the green ball drawn at 
random is 2. 
The number on the green ball is a) greater than my indicated amount. 
 
 b) less than or equal to my indicated amount. 
 
Therefore, I would  a) receive points equal to the number on the ball and not 
play the bet. 
 
 b) play the bet and receive points according to its outcome. 
 
Will you be playing the bet?          (yes/no)  If your answer is YES, you will need to know the 
outcome of the bet before you can determine the points you receive.  If your answer is 
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NO, you do not need to know the outcome of the bet to determine the points received.  
Suppose the red ball drawn to determine the outcome of the bet was 18. 
Based on my point decision above, and the results of the draws from the bingo cages, the 
number of points I would have is _____.   
Complete the next part only if you would have been playing the bet to receive points. 
Suppose the red ball drawn to determine the outcome of the bet was 10 instead of 18. 
Based on my point decision above, and the results of the draws from the bingo cages, the 
number of points I would have is _____. 
Stop here and wait for the experimenter to tell you to go on to Example 2. 
Example 2:  Now use your decision in the Practice Item 1 and suppose instead that the green 
ball drawn at random is 38. 
The number on the green ball is a) greater than my indicated amount. 
 
 b) less than or equal to my indicated amount. 
 
Therefore, I would  a) receive points equal to the number on the ball and not 
play the bet. 
 
 b) play the bet and receive points according to its outcome. 
 
Will you be playing the bet?          (yes/no)  If your answer is YES, you will need to know the 
outcome of the bet before you can determine the points you receive.  If your answer is 
NO, you do not need to know the outcome of the bet to determine the points received.  
Suppose the red ball drawn to determine the outcome of the bet was 18. 
Based on my point decision above, and the results of the draws from the bingo cages, the 
number of points I would have is _____.   
Complete the next part only if you would have been playing the bet to receive points. 
Suppose the red ball drawn to determine the outcome of the bet was 10 instead of 18. 
Based on my point decision above, and the results of the draws from the bingo cages, the 
number of points I would have is _____. 
Stop here and wait for the experimenter to tell you to go on to the next practice item. 
  
Practice Item 2:  Suppose you have the opportunity to play the bet shown below.  What is the 
smallest number of points for which you would give up this opportunity?  
Decision         . 
The green ball drawn at random is          . 
The number on this green ball is  a) greater than my indicated amount. 
 b) less than or equal to my indicated amount. 
Therefore, I would  a) receive points equal to the number on the ball and not 
play the bet.  
b) play the bet and receive points according to the 
outcome. 
The red ball drawn to determine the outcome of the bet was         . 
Based on my decision above, and the results of the draws from the bingo cages, the number of 
points I would have is _____. 
 
Practice Item 3:  Suppose you have the opportunity to play the bet shown below.  What is the 
smallest number of points for which you would give up this opportunity?     
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 Decision         . 
The green ball drawn at random is          . 
The number on this green ball is  a) greater than my indicated amount. 
 b) less than or equal to my indicated amount. 
Therefore, I would  a) receive points equal to the number on the ball and not 
play the bet.  
b) play the bet and receive points according to the 
outcome. 
The red ball drawn to determine the outcome of the bet was         . 
 
Part 3: 
This part is exactly like Part 1.  You will be asked to consider several pairs of bets, and 
for each pair you should indicate which bet you prefer to play or indicate that you are indifferent 
between them.  After each decision, you will then have an opportunity receive points using the 
following procedure: 
1. The bet you indicate as preferred will be played and you will receive the points 
indicated by its outcome.  If you check "Indifferent" the bet you play will be 
determined by a coin toss. 
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IX. B. Instructions for P-RA/RN/RS-NI (Play-Out, Induced Preferences, No Incentives) 
 
Instructions 
This is an experiment in individual decision making.  At the end of the experiment, you 
will receive your $5 show up fee and a flat fee of an additional $15 for participation in the 
experiment.  These are the only payments you will receive for participating.    
As a participant in this experiment, you will have opportunities to play for eighteen 
“prizes.”  “Prizes” in this experiment have no value, however your objective in this experiment is 
to win as many prizes as possible.  Whether or not you receive a particular prize will be 
determined by spinning the spinner on your prize wheel.  If the spinner stops in the area 
designated as the WIN area on your prize wheel, then you will receive the prize.  If the spinner 
stops in the area outside the WIN area, then you will receive nothing. 
For example, suppose the WIN area of your prize wheel is designated as 0 through 5. 
Then, if the spinner stops on a number less than or equal to 5, you will receive the prize.  If the 
spinner stops on a number greater than 5, you will receive nothing.  Although the WIN area on 
your prize wheel will vary, it will always be determined by starting at zero and moving clockwise. 
Now suppose that the WIN area on your prize wheel is designated as 0 through 30.  
Please spin the spinner to determine whether you would have received the prize or not. 
So far, you have discovered that a spin on your prize wheel will determine whether or 
not you receive a prize.  However, you need to know how the WIN area on your prize wheel is 
determined before you can complete the experiment.  The markings on the circumference of 
your prize wheel denote points, and you will receive points for making decisions. There are 18 
decision items in this experiment.  When a decision is made, the WIN area on your prize wheel 
will be designated as the area between 0 and the number of points you receive as a result of the 
decision. Then the spinner on your prize wheel will be spun to determine whether you receive 
the prize.  Points do not accumulate from decision to decision. 
  
Each decision you make will involve one or more bets. These bets will be indicated by 
pie charts as shown below.  When a bet is played, one ball will be drawn from a bingo cage that 
contains 36 red balls numbered 1, 2, …, 36. The ball drawn determines the point outcome of the 
bet. This point outcome will designate the upper boundary of the WIN area on your prize wheel.  
For example, suppose you are playing the bet below.  If the red ball drawn was less than or 
equal to 10, you would receive 30 points.  If the red ball drawn was greater than 10, you would 
receive 5 points. 
Now let's use the bet shown below as a practice item. 
The number that the experimenter drew from the cage of red balls is _____.   
This means that I would receive ____ points as a result of this bet.   
Therefore the WIN area on my prize wheel is designated as 0 through _____.   
Now, spin the spinner. As a result of my spin I would have received   
PRIZE / NOTHING  (circle the correct word). 
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Part 1: 
In this part you will be asked to consider several pairs of bets.  For each pair you should 
indicate which bet you prefer to play or indicate that you are indifferent between them.  After 
each decision, you will have an opportunity to play for a prize using the following procedure: 
1. The bet you indicate as preferred will be played and you will receive the points 
indicated by its outcome.  If you check "Indifferent" the bet you play will be 
determined by a coin toss. 
2. The WIN area of your prize wheel will be designated as the area from 0 
through the number of points which you have received.  You will spin the 
spinner to determine whether you win the prize. 
Part 2: 
In this part you are given several opportunities to play bets to obtain points.  For each 
bet you must indicate the smallest number of points for which you would give up the opportunity 
to play the bet.   
After each decision, you will have an opportunity to play for a prize using the following 
procedure: 
1. A ball will be drawn from a bingo cage containing 41 green balls numbered 
0,1,2,…,40.  If the number on this green ball is less than or equal to the 
number you have specified, you will keep the bet and play it.  You will receive 
the points indicated by the outcome of the bet.  If the number on the green ball 
is greater than the number you have specified, you will give up the bet and in 
exchange receive the points equal to the number on the ball.   
2. The WIN area of your prize wheel will be designated as the area from 0 
through the number of points which you have received.  You will spin the 
spinner to determine whether you win the prize. 
  
It is in your best interest to be accurate; that is, the best thing you can do is be honest.  If 
the number of points you state is too high or too low, then you are passing up opportunities that 
you prefer.  For example, suppose you would be willing to give up the bet for 20 points but 
instead you say that the lowest amount for which you would give it up is 30 points.  If the green 
ball drawn at random is between the two (for example 25) you would be forced to play the bet 
even though you would rather have given it up for 25 points.   
On the other hand, suppose that you would give it up for 20 points but not for less, but 
instead you state your amount as 10 points.  If the green ball drawn at random is between the 
two (for example 15) you would be forced to give up the bet for 15 points even though at that 
amount you would prefer to play it. 
Practice Item 1:  Suppose you have the opportunity to play the bet shown below.  What is the 
smallest number of points for which you would give up this opportunity?  Remember that the 
WIN area on your prize wheel will be designated as the area from 0 through the number of 
points you receive as a result of your decision.  
 
 
Decision             . 
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 In order to determine the WIN area on your prize wheel which results from this decision, 
you need to know two things: 
(1) The ball drawn from the cage of green balls. 
(2) The ball drawn from the cage of red balls. 
The two examples in this practice item fix these draws so that you can concentrate on how your 
decision and the results of the draws will determine your WIN area. 
Example 1:  Use your decision in the Practice Item 1 and suppose the green ball drawn at 
random is 2. 
The number on the green ball is a) greater than my indicated amount. 
 
 b) less than or equal to my indicated amount. 
 
Therefore, I would  a) receive points equal to the number on the ball and not 
play the bet. 
 
 b) play the bet and receive points according to its outcome. 
 
Will you be playing the bet?          (yes/no)  If your answer is YES, you will need to know the 
outcome of the bet before you can determine the WIN area of your prize wheel.  If your 
answer is NO, you do not need to know the outcome of the bet to determine the WIN 
area.  Suppose the red ball drawn to determine the outcome of the bet was 18. 
Based on my point decision above, and the results of the draws from the bingo cages, the 
number of points I would have is _____.   
This means that the WIN area of my prize wheel would cover the numbers 0 through _____.  
If the spinner stopped on the number 5, I would (circle the correct words)  win / not win  the 
prize. 
If the spinner stopped on the number 40, I would (circle the correct words)  win / not win  the 
prize. 
Complete this page only if you would have been playing the bet to receive points. 
Suppose the red ball drawn to determine the outcome of the bet was 10 instead of 18. 
  
Based on my point decision above, and the results of the draws from the bingo cages, the 
number of points I would have is _____. 
This means that the WIN area of my prize wheel would cover the numbers 0 through _____.  
If the spinner stopped on the number 5, I would (circle the correct words)  win / not win  the 
prize. 
If the spinner stopped on the number 40, I would (circle the correct words)  win / not win  the 
prize. 
Stop here and wait for the experimenter to tell you to go on to Example 2. 
Example 2:  Now use your decision in the Practice Item 1 and suppose instead that the green 
ball drawn at random is 38. 
The number on the green ball is a) greater than my indicated amount. 
 
 b) less than or equal to my indicated amount. 
 
Therefore, I would  a) receive points equal to the number on the ball and not 
play the bet. 
 
 b) play the bet and receive points according to its outcome. 
 
Will you be playing the bet?          (yes/no)  If your answer is YES, you will need to know the 
outcome of the bet before you can determine the WIN area of your prize wheel.  If your 
answer is NO, you do not need to know the outcome of the bet to determine the WIN 
area.  Suppose the red ball drawn to determine the outcome of the bet was 18. 
Based on my point decision above, and the results of the draws from the bingo cages, the 
number of points I would have is _____.   
This means that the WIN area of my prize wheel would cover the numbers 0 through _____.  
If the spinner stopped on the number 5, I would (circle the correct words)  win / not win  the 
prize. 
If the spinner stopped on the number 40, I would (circle the correct words)  win / not win  the 
prize. 
Complete this page only if you would have been playing the bet to receive points. 
  
Suppose the red ball drawn to determine the outcome of the bet was 10 instead of 18. 
Based on my point decision above, and the results of the draws from the bingo cages, the 
number of points I would have is _____. 
This means that the WIN area of my prize wheel would cover the numbers 0 through _____.  
If the spinner stopped on the number 5, I would (circle the correct words)  win / not win  the 
prize. 
If the spinner stopped on the number 40, I would (circle the correct words)  win / not win  the 
prize. 
Stop here and wait for the experimenter to tell you to go on to the next practice item. 
Practice Item 2:  Suppose you have the opportunity to play the bet shown below.  What is the 
smallest number of points for which you would give up this opportunity?  Remember that the 
WIN area on your prize wheel will be designated as the area from 0 through the number of 
points you receive as a result of your decision.   
Decision         . 
The green ball drawn at random is          . 
The number on this green ball is  a) greater than my indicated amount. 
 b) less than or equal to my indicated amount. 
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Therefore, I would  a) receive points equal to the number on the ball and not 
play the bet.  
b) play the bet and receive points according to the 
outcome. 
The red ball drawn to determine the outcome of the bet was         . 
Based on my decision above, and the results of the draws from the bingo cages, the number of 
points I would have is _____. 
This means that the WIN area of my prize wheel would cover the numbers 0 through _____, 
My spinner stopped on the number         . 
Therefore I would have (circle the correct words)  won / not won  the prize. 
Practice Item 3:  Suppose you have the opportunity to play the bet shown below.  What is the 
smallest number of points for which you would give up this opportunity?  Remember that the 
WIN area on your prize wheel will be designated as the area from 0 through the number of 
points you receive as a result of your decision.   
 Decision         . 
The green ball drawn at random is          . 
The number on this green ball is  a) greater than my indicated amount. 
 b) less than or equal to my indicated amount. 
Therefore, I would  a) receive points equal to the number on the ball and not 
play the bet.  
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b) play the bet and receive points according to the 
outcome. 
The red ball drawn to determine the outcome of the bet was         . 
Based on my decision above, and the results of the draws from the bingo cages, the number of 
points I would have is _____. 
This means that the WIN area of my prize wheel would cover the numbers 0 through _____, 
My spinner stopped on the number         . 
Therefore I would have (circle the correct words)  won / not won  the prize. 
 
Part 3: 
This part is exactly like Part 1.  You will be asked to consider several pairs of bets, and 
for each pair you should indicate which bet you prefer to play or indicate that you are indifferent 
between them.  After each decision, you will then have an opportunity to play for a prize using 
the following procedure: 
1. The bet you indicate as preferred will be played and you will receive the points 
indicated by its outcome.  If you check "Indifferent" the bet you play will be 
determined by a coin toss. 
2. The WIN area of your prize wheel will be designated as the area from 0 
through the number of points which you have received.  You will spin the 
spinner to determine whether you win the prize. 
 
 
